Tougher issuance conditions related to the surge in government borrowing needs are the reasons why issuance arrangements have not always been working as efficiently as before the crisis. This prompted debt management offices (DMOs) in the OECD area to review existing issuance policies and procedures. The crisis also had an impact on the use of indicators or guidelines relating to the key risks of the maturity structure of issuance or outstanding debt.
Although OECD issuance procedures are likely to differ considerably at the level of technical standards and detailed institutional arrangements, increased integration of global financial markets has encouraged the standardisation of financial instruments and convergence of general issuance procedures. As a result, OECD issuance policies and procedures are broadly similar with a high degree of transparency and predictability.
However, in response to tougher issuance conditions, DMOs have implemented changes in existing issuance procedures and policies that may have led to a somewhat greater diversity of primary market arrangements and procedures. The paper also reviews strategies and indicators for the management of the debt portfolio. Although issuance procedures and targets for portfolio management may have become somewhat more opportunistic in some jurisdictions, debt managers continue to emphasise the importance of transparency and predictability.
B I Introduction
Existing issuance arrangements did not work always as efficiently as before the crisis
Before the crisis, increased integration of global financial markets had led to a situation where OECD issuance policies and procedures were broadly similar with a high degree of transparency and predictability. However, tougher issuance conditions related to the surge in government borrowing needs are the reasons why existing issuance arrangements and procedures have not always been working as efficiently as before the crisis. The crisis also had an impact on the use of indicators or guidelines relating to the key risks of the maturity structure of issuance or outstanding debt. These considerations, in turn, have put the spotlight on the adequacy of existing issuance policies, procedures and portfolio management strategies. The review in this paper shows that in response to the crisis, DMOs have implemented changes in existing issuance procedures and policies that may have led to a somewhat greater diversity of primary market arrangements and portfolio management procedures.
Changes in issuance policies, procedures and portfolio management strategies
Sections II and III provide an overview and update of issuance procedures in the OECD area based on a recent OECD survey. It is explained that, prior to the crisis, an increasingly integrated global financial landscape had encouraged the use of broadly similar issuance procedures and policies. Section IV shows how the explosion in borrowing needs has worsened the issuance environment and tested heavily the performance of existing issuance procedures. Tougher issuance conditions, in turn, have led to changes in issuance procedures (section V). Changes in portfolio management strategies and procedures are discussed in section VI. Section VII discusses the need to review primary dealer arrangements, while the final section concludes.
B II
Increasingly similar issuance procedures and policies in the OECD area?
Differences in issuance procedures… ..especially at technical level
It is widely accepted that government debt issuance procedures and operations should be designed in such a way that they take into account the interests of both issuers and financial market participants 1 . Since policy judgements, economic and financial situations as well as market practices and conventions can be expected to differ, issuance procedures are also likely to differ among OECD jurisdictions. In particular at the technical level, standards, architecture and operations for selling securities, primary dealer systems and other primary market arrangements may differ significantly. These technical and institutional variations may reflect a response to specific structural conditions in markets, policies and differences in traditions and conventions.
However, an increasingly integrated global financial landscape, and the resulting increase in competitive conditions to achieve the cheapest funding, has encouraged the use of broadly similar issuance procedures and policies that facilitate or encourage liquid markets.
…the convergence of OECD public debt policies
More generally, there is wide recognition that broad and deep primary and secondary markets are instrumental in lowering the cost of borrowing for the government.
2 This, in turn, has been a key driver in the growing convergence of OECD debt management policies.
DMOs use broadly similar issuance procedures with high degrees of transparency and predictability
It is therefore not surprising that Debt Management Offices (DMOs) have as stated objectives the development of government securities markets that are liquid and efficient, with market participants operating in a transparent debt policy environment. As a result, we can observe broadly similar issuance procedures and operations with a high degree of transparency and predictability in all OECD countries.
3 For example, the widespread use of auction calendars and electronic auction systems is evidence of the results of this transparency objective in primary markets.
The emergence of global benchmarks
Globalisation has also contributed to the emergence of a number of "standard" financial products centered on a few "global benchmarks" such as the 10-year German Bund and 10-year US Treasury Bonds, serving as liquid pricing vehicles for other markets.
Importance of electronic systems
Electronic systems are increasingly used in primary markets.
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Automation of auction procedures increases their efficiency vis-à-vis the use of manual procedures as it enhances speed, reliability and costeffectiveness. Improved electronic auction systems are therefore important for streamlining the process of submitting bids so that auction results can be processed and disseminated more quickly. More sophisticated systems are also needed to allow institutions to bid directly in auctions.
Auction most common method
Auctions are the issuing procedure most commonly used among the OECD countries. However, some (usually smaller) countries combine auctions with the syndication of benchmark bonds in order to provide a quick build-up of outstanding volume and greater certainty of issue. Regarding the introduction of new instruments, many issuers (also larger countries) conduct the first issue via a syndicated offering. Subsequent issuance is then undertaken via auctions.
OECD policies and market conventions function increasingly as global standards
In sum, OECD countries have seen an increase in the convergence of the composition of debt (maturity structure and instrument type), increased similarities in issuance procedures, and increased standardisation of market conventions. Integrated markets and the spread of OECD leading policy practices and market standards, in turn, have influenced developments in government debt issuance around the world. Consequently, the standards embedded in the issuance policies, procedures and portfolio strategies found in the Surveys among OECD members (see sections III, VI and VII) represent increasingly global standards. The Annual OECD Global Forum on Public Debt Management is serving as the principal vehicle for the world-wide dissemination of these standards, leading practices and related policies. 2 .Aust ria Syndication for port ion of each issue.
3.Belgium Syndication used for benchmarks bonds.
4.Canada
Syndication used for foreign currency debt issuance (for foreign exchange reserve funding purposes only).
A single price auct ion format is used for issuance of inflation-linked bonds.
5.Czech Republic Syndication used for "Eurobonds", single-price for T -bills, mult iple-price for bonds.
6.Denmark
Long term foreign issuance is primarily conduct ed via syndication.
Commercial Paper (CP) programmes are used for short-t erm foreign issuance.
7.Finland
Issuance of T -bills via multiple-price auctions.
8.France
Syndication is usually used once a year, essentially for the first issuance of a new line.
9. Germany Syndication for t he first issuance of a linker, its first re-opening and its first tap.
Syndication used for second USD bond.
10.Greece
Syndication used for first issuance of medium-and long-term bonds and linkers. Public subscription for retail investors.
Introduct ion of syndications for all t ypes of bonds and re-openings. Switch to single-price auctions for T -bills.
11.Hungary Some T -bills are sold via t ap sales or via subscription for ret ail invest ors. Syndications for forex debt issuance.
12.Iceland
Syndication or private placement is used for bonds in foreign currency; Dut ch Direct auct ion for long term bonds.
13.Italy
Syndication for first tranche of long term bonds and for Global bonds. Privat e placement used for external debt .
14.Korea Syndicat ion for first issuance of inflat ion-linked bonds and foreign exchange st abilisat ion bonds.
Switch from single-price to multiple-price auctions. Also buy-back auct ions in multiple-price format.
15.Mexico
Foreign currency debt is issued via investment banks.
16.Netherlands Dutch Direct Auct ion (uniform price) is used for longer dated bonds.
17.New Zealand T ap sales are used for external debt (both long and short term). Auctions are primarily used for domest ic borrowing operations.
18.Poland Syndication is used for external debt. Use of retail agent s for domestic securit ies. Single-price auction is used in supplementary auctions.
19.Portugal
Syndication is used for first issuance of bonds. Direct negot iat ions for MT N and ECP programmes.
20. Slovak Republic Syndication is used for tranch of each issue.
21.Spain
Syndication for new long benchmarks and foreign currency debt. T he auction format is a mixture of single-and multiple price.
22.Sweden
Syndication for foreign currency debt and occasionally for domest ic currency bonds.
23.T urkey Direct sale t o inst it ut ional invest ors and public offers t o ret ail invest ors. Single-price auct ions are used only for inflat ion-linked bonds.
24.United Kingdom T aps for market management are reserved for exceptional circumstances only. Int roduction of syndication.
Use of single-price auct ions (linkers) and bid--price auct ions (nominal bonds and T -bills).

Auctions Auction type Tap issues
Source: Responses to the 2009 Survey of the OECD Working Party on Debt Management.
III. Results from a recent survey on OECD issuance procedures and policies
The principal issuing procedures are auction and tap
An increase in the use of syndication
The principal issuing procedures are auction and tap. The responses show that almost all OECD countries use auctions for issuing new longterm debt, while 26 DMOs also use auctions for issuing short-term debt (Table 1a) . Interestingly, syndication is now also being used by a number of larger countries and not only by smaller countries for selling benchmark bonds. This procedure is usually credited with achieving very rapidly a high initial outstanding volume, thereby boosting liquidity and achieving greater placing certainty with lower borrowing costs. Syndication is often also used for the first-time issuance of new instruments such as linkers or ultra-long bonds. Table 1a shows that 20 OECD countries are now using syndication for issuing debt. This is an increase compared to earlier surveys, including a previous OECD study 5 showing a considerable increase in the use of syndication among Eurozone countries.
Use of tap issues
Tap issues are less frequently used, with 7 OECD DMOs using taps for issuing short-term debt and 10 for long-term debt.
Multiple-price preferred auction type but almost half of DMOs uses both auction formats
The preferred auction type tends to be the multiple-price format. However, in 17 countries single-price 7 auctions are used as well. Twelve countries employ both types of auctions. In the US, single-price auctions are used for all Treasury auctions. Nonetheless, although the main auction types in OECD are broadly similar, they often vary in terms of operational and technical details.
IV. The explosion in borrowing needs has worsened the issuance environment
Borrowing needs have increased significantly in response to the soaring costs of financial support schemes and other crisis-related expenditures as well as recession-induced falls in tax income and an increase in recession-related expenditures. Many OECD governments are therefore facing a further increase in expected deficits. As a result, it is estimated that the gross borrowing requirements of OECD governments for 2009 will be close to USD 16 trillion. The tentative outlook for 2010 shows a stabilising borrowing picture, at around the same level. The 2010 funding outlook is, however, surrounded by an unusually high degree of uncertainty. 
Strong supply has worsened issuance conditions
This dramatic increase in the supply of government paper has worsened issuance conditions, with some OECD debt managers reporting liquidity pressures in secondary markets and sometimes weak demand and distortions in primary markets. Delegates from the OECD Working Party on Public Debt Management (WPDM) confirmed the following trends and developments: (a) dramatically increased borrowing requirements and concerns about possible market absorption problems 9 ; (b) changes in issuance methods, including more flexible auctions, introduction of auction fees, and the use of distribution methods other than auctions such as syndication, Dutch Direct Auction (DDA) procedures and private placement (see section V); (c) changes in optimal sovereign portfolios (driven by new benchmarks with a greater emphasis on short-term paper and a reformulated cost-risk trade-offsee section VI).
V. Tougher issuance conditions have led to changes in issuance procedures
9 B Softening of demand has led to postponed or less successful auctions These dramatically increased borrowing needs have, in turn, led to sharply increased competition in raising funds. Additional competition also came from the issuance of government-guaranteed bank bonds. Issuance conditions have therefore become tougher with reports about a softening of demand at some auctions, leading to postponed, failed or cancelled auctions. These developments, together with the decline in the number of primary dealers (section VII), are raising important policy issues such as:
The risk to the success of auctions and greater auction tails.
• The risk to the liquidity of Treasuries in the secondary markets.
Future issuance could become more challenging
Less successful auctions have been ascribed to uncertainties about potential market absorption issues and volatile market conditions. All in all, DMOs have been very successful in raising funds. Difficulties surrounding auctions can therefore best be interpreted as "single market events" and not as unambiguous evidence of systemic market absorption problems. However, the future could become more challenging given that the still rising issuance trend is occurring hand in hand with increasing overall debt levels. For example, total marketable debt of central governments in Japan, the US and euro zone stood at nearly USD 21 trillion, more than double the level a decade before. In 2009, it is projected to be over USD 27 trillion.
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DMOs have adopted changes in issuance procedures
In response, several DMOs have adopted changes in issuance procedures so as to address the consequences of increased competition in raising funds and (potential) market absorption problems. For example, many DMOs have introduced more flexible auction calendars and/or more flexibility in the amounts offered. Issuers have also introduced new distribution facilities.
Maintaining direct investor relations more important than before
Maintaining investor relations has become even more important than before with many DMOs reporting greater urgency for organising road shows for large (foreign) investors. To that end, during crisis periods direct contacts with investors (including via road shows) are essential, in particular to explain changes in the overall situation and policy-framework. Moreover, especially in the current, challenging circumstances characterised by high government borrowing needs, many DMOs observed that a broad and diverse foreign investor base remains essential in maintaining a diversified and liquid domestic government bond market. 
Preferences investors key consideration Transparency at core of relations with market
This means taking into account both the preferences of foreign and domestic investors, including when making changes in issuance procedures and techniques. DMOs should also pay attention to (improving) all forms of communication, including the construction of high-quality websites. Although issuance programmes have become somewhat more opportunistic, a transparent debt management framework remains at the core of good relationships with the market. In this context, primary dealers' principal job is to sell debt, while the principal task of DMOs is to explain how they (and the government more generally) operate. Table 1b provides an overview of the major changes made in issuance procedures and/or the conditions for using existing systems and techniques in response to the crisis and tougher issuance conditions. For example, as noted, there are reports about an increasing interest in the use of syndication. As noted, this selling method is credited with the potential to rapidly achieve a very high initial outstanding volume of issues with better placing certainty than auctions. This may, in turn, lead to higher liquidity and lower borrowing costs. However, syndication also has potential downsides such as a more limited reach among potential buyers, more risk averse investors than dealers participating in auctions, and higher intermediation costs.
Increasing interest in syndication
More frequent auctions with more flexible and opportunistic procedures
There are already signs that liquidity pressures, rising borrowing requirements and risk-averse behaviour of investors are forcing debt managers to modify their fund raising strategies. Regarding the operation of auction schemes, many DMOs are operating more frequent auctions with auction schedules having become more flexible and opportunistic. The maturity of debt is becoming shorter. There is growing use of foreign liabilities, and debt managers are using a wider range of instruments, including bills and notes.
Transparency and predictability remain key
These changes, while understandable, create some risks. As debt managers become more opportunistic, issuance programmes are becoming less predictable. That may not be desirable in the long term. DMOs emphasise therefore that they will continue to operate a transparent debt management framework supported by a strong communication policy. Transparency and predictability are instrumental in reducing the type of market noise that can unnecessarily increase borrowing costs.
Some DMOs introduced auction fees and the UK mini-tenders
Some DMOs were considering introducing (or have introduced) auction fees. Others argue that fees are not effective and/or not consistent with the principle of open auctions. Mini-tenders were introduced by the UK DMO alongside the scheduled auction calendar in order to mitigate liquidity problems.
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Suggestions for studying joint issuance in Euro-zone
On several occasions, suggestions have been made that Euro-zone issuers 13 should explore practical ways to issue government paper jointly. This debate seems to have gained some traction from recent issuance problems, with several European countries being forced to cancel bond issues due to lack of interest by investors. These problems have revived discussions about closer co-operation in the form of joint issuance policies, including the issuance of a joint European short-term debt instrument that would be able to attract additional investors due to its increased issuance size (and resulting liquidity).
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Increased retail issuance… …complicated by financial stability considerations
Another possible change in issuance strategies may be a stronger emphasis on retail issuance so as to broaden and stabilise the investor base. Increased use of electronic systems has made it easier to reach retail investors directly. However, a possible downside concerns a lack of cost-effectiveness(although the greater use of electronic means has improved the scope to reduce distribution costs). A new complication in some countries is the financial stability perspective. Although the introduction of additional retail funding instruments may lead to lower borrowing costs, this policy move may not be desirable in the current crisis situation in which banks try to strengthen their balance sheets by increasing retail deposits. Hence, in some markets, additional competition from retail instruments issued by DMOs may not, at the moment, be desirable on financial stability grounds.
VI. Survey of the Impact of the Financial Crisis on Debt Portfolio Management Strategies
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Why portfolio management?
Managing key risks associated with debt portfolios
This section reports the results of a survey conducted in October 2009 on the impact of the financial crisis on the portfolio management strategies of members of the OECD Working Party on Debt Management. Government debt managers need to monitor and manage the key risks associated with their debt portfolios in order to reduce the cost of debt for their respective governments, at least on average over the medium term. Portfolio management can also help manage the volatility in the government's balance sheet and its net worth. Most managers seek to some degree to balance the cost and risk of their debt portfolios, where the risks include refinancing risks, repricing risks and interest rate risks.
Use of different strategies and indicators
Different debt managers may use different strategies and indicators to monitor portfolio risks and guide their portfolio management. Some use targets or limits for indicators such as average duration, modified duration, or the proportion of the portfolio subject to refinancing or price refixing within a specified period. Some use broader guidelines related to the maturity structure of their issuance or outstanding debt, and its distribution between different debt instruments.
The crisis complicates portfolio management with implications for the issuance task
Unusual volatility in markets, such as during the recent global financial crisis, and sharp changes in governments' borrowing requirements, can make it more difficult to maintain debt management strategies. This may have consequences for the ongoing cost of debt servicing and future gross borrowing requirements. For example, if the amount of short-term debt in the portfolio increases, the amount of debt maturing in the short term, and requiring to be refinanced, will be higher, adding to the future issuance task.
Focus of the OECD survey
What are the changes that have been made in the management of interest rate risk?
The survey aimed to identify what changes debt managers have made in the management of the interest rate risk of their portfolios in response to changes in their financing tasks following the financial crisis. The survey asked debt managers that have had a benchmark duration target in the recent past: (i) What was the target duration and how often was it reviewed?
(ii) Is the target set on the gross debt portfolio or a net debt portfolio (gross debt less cash and other assets)?
(iii) Has the funding task become more variable and/or more difficult to forecast in the last year?
(iv) If so, has the variability in the funding task impacted upon your capacity to achieve the duration target? The survey also asked, more generally (whether or not agencies have duration targets), what changes had occurred in the duration and maturity structure of their portfolios over the last two years?
Summary and conclusions
Seventeen responses to the survey were received and some other countries provided additional information at the annual meeting of the Working Party held on 20-21 October 2009. This summary includes information from both sources.
Half respondents use duration target
About one third of the respondents indicated that they currently have a duration target as a primary portfolio management tool. Two respondents target it indirectly and two use it as a secondary target. Half do not use it as a target. Is there a duration target?
Duration targets vary from two to seven years
Of those who had a duration target, about half measure it against a gross debt portfolio and half against some form of net debt portfolio. Targets and ranges for those countries targeting duration either as a primary measure or as a secondary measure, vary from two years to seven years. Countries that manage their portfolios using a benchmark duration target generally review the target at least annually, with some undertaking more frequent reviews following the increased variability in outcomes as a result of the crisis.
The funding task has become more variable and difficult
The majority of respondents considered that the funding task has become more variable and/or more difficult in the last year, with most noting a substantial increase in the amount of government debt issued over forecasts. For those with a duration target: Has the funding task become more variable and/or more difficult to forecast in the last year?
All respondants: Has the funding task become more variable and/or more difficult to forecast in the last year?
Switzerland is an exception as it reduced its central government gross debt (from a peak of CHF 130 billion in 2005 to CHF 119 billion in 2009, which is expected to fall further) due to continuing budget surpluses and the sale of the government's stake in UBS. It reduced its bond issuance, allowing debt to mature whilst maintaining short-term borrowing. As a result, funding has become less difficult and less variable and previously announced issuance targets are being underachieved. Its main challenge is deciding how far to let government debt outstanding decline without limiting the bond market's ability to function.
Increased variability in duration and other portfolio benchmark measures
Respondents generally reported increased variability in duration and other portfolio benchmark measures. However, of the ten respondents with some form of a duration target, only two did not achieve their targets and less than half reported that changes in the funding task had impacted upon their capacity to achieve their duration target. Of those that met the duration target, none had made changes to the target in the last year and none had introduced additional instruments or techniques in order to achieve targets.
Of the two countries that did not meet their duration targets, one has revoked the target and the other is reviewing its approach in the light of its experiences over the past year. For those with a duration target: Has this variability in the funding task impacted on the capacity to achieve the duration target?
DMOs report falls in duration and maturity measures
Many respondents reported falls in duration and maturity measures for their debt portfolios. In some cases, this reflected increased government funding requirements and/or the fact that investor demand was focused towards the short end of the curve. 
VII. How urgent is the need to review primary dealer arrangements?
Primary dealer arrangements differ
Primary dealer (PD) systems in the various OECD countries are quite different in terms of obligations/requirements, either in technical detail or even in broad terms. For example, market making (MM) rules in secondary markets are often part of the set of PD requirements, but not in all jurisdictions
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. In addition, some OECD countries either do not possess PD systems or dealers are formally (or de jure) not recognised as such by the issuer. See Tables 2a, 2b and 2c for an overview of requirements imposed on (candidate) primary dealers in the OECD area.
PD arrangements have not been working as efficiently as before the crisis
Tough issuance conditions are the reasons why existing PD arrangements have not always been working as efficiently as before the crisis. This raises the question of whether requirements as summarised in Tables 2a, 2b and 2c need to be revised, temporarily or on a more permanent basis.
Changes in model of cooperation?
Another primary market issue is whether the broader business model of co-operation with PDs needs to be changed. The business models in the US and Japan are based on the philosophy that DMOs have a hands-off relationship with PDs. For example, the US Treasury, through its issuing agent (the Fed of New York), has a hands-off approach with all its primary dealers; it sees its task ending with the conditions of primary issuance and is therefore only concerned with on-the-run securities. In both the US and Japan, market-making responsibilities in secondary markets are not imposed on primary dealers (Table 2b) . However, this hands-off relationship does not preclude a meaningful dialogue with the market. For example, in Japan, primary dealers are being consulted about important debt management policies such as the JGB issuance plan and buy-back programmes. In the case of Germany, banks are not formally designated as primary dealers. Instead, a selected international group of banks, called the Bund Issuance Auction Group,17 bid in auctions. 
Debate about market-making obligations
In contrast to a more general hands-off approach, several DMOs played a more activist role by giving PDs direct incentives or privileges in return for market-making (MM) obligations. This approach may reflect the challenges faced in fragmented and/or smaller markets. In some jurisdictions, however, the effectiveness of MM-obligations is under discussion. This debate is in part fuelled by the ongoing financial crisis and may lead (or has led) to changes in the current market infrastructure, including via the introduction or presence of multiple electronic trading platforms. 
Insolvent and fragile balance sheets of PDs may negatively affect their future operations
Primary and secondary market activities have been negatively affected by both insolvent and fragile balance sheets of primary dealers. Many DMOs expressed concerns about this development and its implications for future operations. In several countries, recent events are accelerating a longer-term trend of a reduction in the number of (active) primary dealers. For example, the number of primary dealers transacting in US Treasuries declined from its peak of 46 in 1988 to 21 in 2007 and to 17 active primary dealers as of September 2008. Consequently, this raises the following policy issues:
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Additional reasons to review PD obligations and privileges
•
The risk of lower competition in the primary market, possibly weakening the price discovery process.
• The risk of dominance in the government securities market by a few large banks.
• The risk of overall higher funding costs to finance government operations.
These issues may be additional reasons to review existing PD requirements (obligations) and privileges. Source: Updated Survey of Italian Treasury.
VIII. Conclusions
Worsening issuance conditions and changes in issuing procedures
The worsening of issuance conditions manifests itself via greater risks (a) in primary markets in the form of less successful auctions and greater auction tails; and (b) in secondary markets in the form of liquidity pressures and price distortions. These (potential) problems are encouraging changes in issuance methods, including the use of distribution methods other than auctions such as syndication, Dutch Direct Auction (DDA) procedures and private placement. Especially during crisis periods, direct contacts with large (foreign) investors (including via road shows) are more important than before, in particular to explain changes in the overall situation and policy-framework. All forms of communication are of importance, including high-quality websites. In this context, primary dealers' principal job is to sell debt, while the principal task of DMOs is to explain how they (and the government more generally) operate.
Many DMOs are using more flexible auctions with issuance programmes becoming less predictable and more opportunistic. That may not be desirable in the long term. DMOs emphasise therefore that they will continue to operate a transparent debt management framework supported by a strong communication policy. Some debt managers are considering introducing (or have introduced) auction fees. Others argue that fees are not effective and/or not consistent with the principle of open auctions. Mini-tenders were introduced by the UK DMO alongside the scheduled auction calendar in order to mitigate liquidity problems.
Challenges and changes in debt portfolio risk management
For most DMOs, the funding task has become more variable and/or more difficult, with most noting a substantial increase in the amount of government debt issued over forecasts.
Debt managers generally reported increased variability in duration and other portfolio benchmark measures.
Many DMOs reported falls in duration and maturity measures for their debt portfolios. In some cases, this reflected increased government funding requirements and/or the fact that investor demand was focused towards the short end of the curve.
How urgent is the need to review primary dealer arrangements? 1 5 B Tough issuance conditions are the reasons why existing PD arrangements have not always been working as efficiently as before the crisis. This raises the question of whether current requirements need to be revised, temporarily or on a more permanent basis, including whether the broader business model of co-operation between DMOs and PDs needs to be changed. An assessment also needs to be made of the viability of market-making (MM) obligations in relation to possible changes in the current market infrastructure such as electronic platforms.
Primary and secondary market activities have been negatively affected by both insolvent and fragile balance sheets of primary dealers. Many DMOs expressed concerns about this development and its implications for future operations. In several countries, recent events are accelerating a longer-term trend of a reduction in the number of (active) primary dealers.
